1 While other anecdotes also suggest that players are excessively rewarded for performing well in the final years of their contracts, testing the hypothesis that teams have short memories requires a comprehensive analysis of players' salaries.
In this paper, I analyze salary and performance data for all Major League Baseball hitters who signed free agent contracts from [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The data shows that a player's performance this year is predicted about 20% more strongly by his performances from two and three years ago than by his performance from last year by itself. In contrast, a player's salary this year depends only half as much on his performances from two and three years ago as on his performance from last year. In other words, for determining future performance, there is more information in a player's earlier performance history than in his performance last year alone. Salaries, however, respond much more strongly to performance in that most recent year than to the earlier performance history.
Teams are not equally prone to undervaluing earlier performance relative to recent performance. Controlling for total payroll, the teams that win the most games use past performance data most effectively. Only the unsuccessful teams put significantly too much weight on recent performance relative to earlier performance. One plausible explanation for this result is that well-managed teams are less susceptible to making memory-based mistakes in their salary offers.
What could cause memory-based biases to affect baseball salaries? Previous research in the psychology of memory offers a compelling explanation. People often access the most salient memories when making decisions. Reacting primarily to salient memories in this way corresponds to the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Mullainathan, 2002) .
The most salient memory about a player who just had a remarkable season may be his recent outstanding play, while other relevant performance data fails to stand out as much. Availability could have caused the Seattle Mariners, for example, to believe that Adrian Beltre's lone exceptional season more accurately described the player's skills than his previous years of unexceptional play. 2 In general, this sort of behavior could explain why teams fail to take into account a player's performance in earlier years when making a salary offer.
In Section I, I describe the methods used to measure the determinants of a baseball player's performance and salary. In Section II, I discuss the data used in the analysis. In Section III, I present the main empirical results. Section IV concludes.
I. Estimation Strategy
As in previous research using baseball data, I focus on a player's contribution towards winning games, through which the player affects a team's revenues (Scully, 1974; Sommers and Quinton, 1982; Fort and Quirk, 1992) . The previous research indicates that, to maximize revenues, a team primarily needs to focus on winning games. To the extent that other factors influence salary offers, the estimation strategy only requires that those other factors are not related to changes in a player's performance history over time.
In this paper, I will focus entirely on hitters. A variety of measures capture different aspects of a hitter's value to his team. The number of home runs that a player hits, a player's onbase percentage, and his slugging percentage are three such measures. Previous research suggests that a simple measure called OPS, the sum of on-base percentage and slugging percentage, is an accurate measure of a player's offensive value (Albert and Bennett, 2001 ). To measure a player's value, OPS performs nearly as well as more complicated measures and better than any measure of similar complexity (Hakes and Sauer, 2006) . In this paper, I use OPS to measure a player's worth. All results are largely the same if a different measure of player performance is used.
To formalize these ideas, consider a player i whose performance in year t is OPS it . I model the player's performance this year as a weighted average of his performance in the previous k years, other observed variables x it , and unobserved factors captured by u it .
(1)
states that our prediction of a player's performance this year is based on his past performances, with higher weight likely assigned to more recent years. The error term, u it , arises because previous performance does not perfectly predict current performance.
To model player salaries, I use the log of salary, since the salary data is heavily skewed.
Take the log of a player's salary to be a function of the same variables that predict his performance.
The error term, , in the above regression comes from any aspect of player value that is not included in the model. Equations (1) and (2) suggest the test that I will conduct in this paper. If teams are optimally using previous performance information to predict players' future performances, the coefficients that relate previous performance to current performance should exhibit the same pattern over time as the coefficients that relate previous performance to current pay. Suppose we estimate that a 1 point increase in last year's OPS causes current OPS to be 0.6 points higher.
Also suppose we estimate that an increase in OPS from two years ago of 1 point causes current OPS to be 0.3 points higher. Current performance is then twice as sensitive to last year's performance as to performance from two years ago. If management acts optimally, its salary offers will also be twice as sensitive to a player's performance in the previous year as to his performance from two years ago.
II. The Data
To test hypotheses relating to how effectively teams use past performance data to make salary offers, I utilize data on free agent signings in Major League Baseball from 1985-2004.
The term free agent refers to a player whose contract has expired and who is free to negotiate with all teams except his original team. The competition for highly-valued free agents can be fierce. To ensure that the few high salaries do not have excessive influence on the regression results, the salary regressions use the log of salary as the dependent variable.
III. Results
In this section, I estimate how a player's performance history affects current performance
and salary. The data shows that past performance predicts current performance and salary in strikingly different ways. In addition, the data shows that these differences and the inefficiencies they imply do not occur for the teams that are generally managed more effectively. Table 1 presents the results from estimating the performance and salary equations.
Testing for Short Memories
Columns (1) through (4) pertain to the regressions that use performance as the dependent variable, and columns (5) through (8) refer to the regressions that use salary as the dependent variable. If a model includes a particular independent variable, there will be a coefficient for that variable in the table. The table shows that the results are robust to different specifications. In the discussion below, I will focus on the results in columns 4 and 8, which consider the specifications that include three years of previous performance and the age variables.
As shown in column 4, a player's performance is predicted only slightly more effectively by last year's performance than by his performance from two years ago. The regression of current performance on the performance from the three previous years gives a coefficient of 0.343 for last year's performance and 0.263 for performance from two years ago. The difference between the two coefficients is insignificant (p = 0.308). On the other hand, an increase in last year's performance is about twice as effective at increasing that player's salary as is an increase in performance from two years ago. The coefficient for last year's performance is 3.345, while the coefficient for performance from two years ago is 1.623. The difference between the two coefficients is significant (p = 0.001).
While teams could do somewhat better by assigning more weight to performance data from two years ago, they are even more ineffective at using earlier performance data.
Performance from three years ago predicts performance this year with a coefficient of 0.15, a little less than half the coefficient for last year's performance. The hypothesis that performance from three years ago is an insignificant predictor of current performance can be rejected (p = 0.004). In contrast, the coefficient for performance from three years ago on salary is 0.215, about one-fifteenth as large as the effect of last year's performance. Moreover, the hypothesis that performance from three years ago has no effect on current salary cannot be rejected (p = 0.512). Table 2 directly compares the relative effects that performances in different years have on current performance and on salary. For example, for current performance, the predictive power of performance from two years ago is about 0.767 times as large as performance from last year.
For salary, the predictive power of performance from two years ago relative is about 0.485 times as large as performance from last year. The difference between these two ratios is noticeable, but not significant (p = 0.186). In predicting current performance, the effect of performance from three years ago is about 0.437 times the effect of performance from last year. The estimated effect of performance from three years ago on salary is only 0.064 times the effect of last year's performance. The difference between the two ratios is marginally significant (p = 0.056).
Taken together, the effects of all three earlier years on performance and salary indicate the significant gap between how teams actually use past performance data and how they would optimally use that information. For current performance, the predictive power of performance from two and three years ago is about 1.204 times larger than performance from last year. For salary, the predictive power of performance from two and three years ago is only 0.549 times the performance from last year. The difference between these two ratios is significant (p = 0.010).
If the goal is to predict how well a player will perform, there is more combined information in that player's performances from two and three years ago than in his performance from last year by itself. Nevertheless, teams put about twice as much weight on last year's performance than the combined weight they put on a player's performances from two and three years ago.
Successful and Unsuccessful Teams
In Figure This classification makes it possible to test for differences in how successful teams utilize past performance information compared to how unsuccessful teams use that information. To conduct these tests, I estimate regressions (1) and (2) separately for the successful and unsuccessful teams. The results are shown in Table 3 . In the discussion below, I focus on the results in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 that consider the specifications that include the age variables. players after one anomalous good season, then the players that these teams sign will have their performances better predicted by earlier years than players signed by successful teams. Table 4 confirms that only the unsuccessful teams show significant memory-based biases in their salary offers. The successful teams treat past performance data similarly to how they optimally would. For example, in predicting current performance (salary), the effect of performance from three years ago is about 0.287 (0.138) as large as the effect of performance from last year. The difference between the two ratios is insignificant (p = 0.638). Taken together, performances from two and three years ago have an effect on present performance that is 1.081 times the effect of than last year's performance by itself. Similarly, performances from two and three years ago have 0.757 times the effect on salary as last year's performance by itself.
The ratios for performance and salary are similar and the difference is insignificant (p = 0.642).
In contrast, the unsuccessful teams use past performance data to determine salaries in a significantly different way than that information predicts future performance. For these teams, performance from three years ago predicts current performance about 0.764 times as well as the effect of performance from last year. When choosing their salary offers, though, unsuccessful teams put only about 0.034 times as much weight on performance from three years ago as on last year's performance. The difference between these two ratios is marginally significant (p = 0.052). Altogether, for unsuccessful teams, performances from two and three years ago predict present performance about 1.613 times better than last year's performance does by itself. Still, for these teams, performances from two and three years ago predict salary only 0.411 times as well as last year's performance by itself. The difference between these ratios is significant (p = 0.046). Relative to last year's performance, a player's earlier performance history predicts future performance four times more effectively than it predicts that player's salary. No such difference is present for the successful teams.
IV. Conclusion
To best use the dollars that they spend on salaries, organizations need to predict how well players will perform in the future. The data shows that organizations make systematic mistakes in how they make these predictions. Teams infer too much from players' performances in the most recent season relative to performances from earlier years. The organizations that make these mistakes are the same ones that generally fail to spend their resources well. Organizations that are otherwise more successful also use past performance data more effectively.
The sizeable mistakes that unsuccessful teams make could arise from two different hypotheses about player behavior in the final year of a contract. First, it may be the case that players are rewarded for good luck in the last seasons of their contract, as previous research has demonstrated that CEOs are rewarded for luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2002) . In support of this hypothesis, Albert and Bennett (2001) show that a player's performance in any given year reflects a great deal of luck. On the other hand, there may be certain players who exert greater effort in the final years of their contracts and certain teams repeatedly fail to recognize this behavior. The tendency shown in this paper for teams to excessively reward performance at the end of a contract would amplify a player's incentive to try harder in his contract year. Future research could attempt to determine whether teams are rewarding players for luck in the final years of their contracts or for extra effort that they exerted in their contract years. 2 A related phenomenon, the "hot hand", can also be understood by invoking the availability heuristic as it applies to memory. Camerer (1989) , for example, finds that bettors incorrectly believe that a basketball team's recent success predicts its future success. Likewise, Gray and Gray (1997) find that odds for football games are skewed towards teams that have had recent success. They find that bettors' behavior "is consistent with the idea that the market overreacts to recent form, discounting the performance of the team over the season as a whole." 4 I thank Sean Lahman of The Baseball Archive for help in accessing this data. 5 The division of teams remains the same if a higher-order polynomial in relative payroll is used in the regression, rather than a simple linear regression.
6 Tampa Bay entered Major League Baseball as an expansion team in 1998. 7 In addition, the R 2 for the salary regressions are larger for the successful teams than for the unsuccessful teams, indicating that there is less unexplained variation in the salary offers made by successful teams.
(1) a) Regression standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include all players who had at least 150 at-bats in the present year and the three previous years.
b) A player's performance is measured by his OPS, the at-bats variables are expressed in thousands of at-bats, and the salary variable is the log of a player's salary. c) Each regression includes year and team dummies. b) Boostrapping using the coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix from the regressions in columns 4 and 8 of Table 1 give the standard error estimates for the ratios. a) Regression standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include all players who had at least 150 at-bats in the present year and the three previous years.
b) A player's performance is measured by his OPS, the at-bats variables are expressed in thousands of at-bats, and the salary variable is the log of a player's salary. b) Boostrapping using the coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix from the regressions in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 3 give the standard error estimates for the ratios. 
